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ABSTRACT—The Take Care Clause obligates the President to enforce the 
law. Yet increasingly, presidents use nonenforcement to unilaterally waive 
legislative provisions to serve their executive policy goals. In doing so, the 
President’s inaction takes the practical form of a congressional repeal—a 
task that is solely reserved for Congress under the Constitution. Presidential 
nonenforcement therefore usurps Congress’s unique responsibility in 
setting the national policy agenda. 
This Note addresses whether Congress has standing to sue in instances 
of presidential nonenforcement to realign and reaffirm Congress’s unique 
legislative role. In answering this question, this Note examines legislative 
standing precedent and argues that the Supreme Court’s reasoning supports 
a finding of congressional institutional standing. This Note further contends 
that it is normatively preferable for the judiciary to police the boundaries of 
each branch of government in instances of executive nonenforcement and 
apply the Constitution’s mandate that the President take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed. This maintains separation of powers and prevents 
one branch from unconstitutionally aggregating the power of another. 
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[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea 
of separation of powers.  
—Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) 
INTRODUCTION 
It is 2028. Although the Democrats have controlled Congress and the 
presidency for the past eight years, a new Republican President has just 
taken office. Between 2020 and 2028, the Democrats achieved many of 
their goals, passing a wide range of legislation—from campaign finance to 
gun reform—that has all passed constitutional muster. Despite the 
Republicans’ success in the presidential election, Democrats still control 
the House and Senate by a bare majority. 
Nevertheless, the President has already promised to veto new 
legislation unless it fits with Republican priorities. She has also denounced 
the Democrats’ legislation over the past eight years, and has stated she will 
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do everything in her power to reverse the damage it perpetuated. To start, 
she has already refused to enforce the Public Safety and Gun Violence 
Reform Act. Criminals will be deterred from public acts of violence if they 
think their victims are armed. Therefore, she argues, the Executive Branch 
will refuse to prosecute the public carrying of arms and the ban on high-
capacity magazines. At Republican rallies, she has even hinted that she 
may refuse to enforce the legislation entirely. 
Democrats condemn the President’s actions as unconstitutional, if not 
tyrannical, and as a breach of her executive duties to enforce the law. They 
argue that she has become a legislature unto herself, and has disregarded 
the separation of powers principles inherent in our structure of government. 
But what can be done to compel the President to enforce the law? Are 
the Democrats forced to patiently wait out the end of her presidency, or 
may Congress sue to realign and reaffirm Congress’s unique legislative 
role? 
Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution states that “[the 
President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”1 The Take 
Care Clause was enacted against the historical backdrop of English kings 
like James II, who frequently used executive power to implement policy 
goals against the expressed will of Parliament by simply not enforcing 
Parliament’s legislation.2 The Framers, leery of the historical monarchical 
abuses that had occurred in England, would not have considered the 
President’s authority to entail policymaking through inaction.3 The Take 
Care Clause was intended to curb this power by imposing a duty to 
enforce—not dispense or suspend—the law. 
Yet, today we return to this old problem: executive inaction. 
Increasingly, the Executive uses nonenforcement to unilaterally waive and 
delay certain provisions of legislation to serve the Administration’s policy 
goals. This sets a dangerous precedent, threatening separation of powers, 
whereby the President usurps Congress’s unique responsibility of setting 
the national policy agenda. But does Congress as an institution have 
standing to sue the Executive when she does not enforce a statute’s text? 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
2 See, e.g., The President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 15 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Hearing] (statement of Jonathan 
Turley, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington University Law School); Robert 
J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration 
Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 805–06 (2013); Zachary S. 
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 690–91 (2014). 
3 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1651–52 (2008); Price, supra note 2, at 731. 
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Although legislative standing has been generally addressed in scholarship,4 
legal scholarship has neglected to address whether Congress has standing 
to sue when the Executive fails to enforce the law.5 Further, at the writing 
of this Note, no scholars have addressed congressional standing in light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent legislative standing decision in Arizona State 
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. Because the 
injury determines the remedy, it is first necessary to assess if there is a 
congressional injury, and if there is such an injury, ascertain what that 
particular injury is. 
This Note argues that Supreme Court precedent and the reasoning of 
lower federal courts support a finding of congressional standing in 
instances of presidential nonenforcement. This Note further argues that it is 
normatively preferable for Congress to have standing because it needs a 
way to assert its unique legislative role and reorient the balance of powers 
in the event that a president exceeds constitutionally outlined powers and 
unilaterally nullifies duly enacted legislation. 
Part I of this Note analyzes the Take Care Clause and the duties that it 
obligates the President to perform, and demonstrates that presidents are 
increasingly using nonenforcement as a means of setting national policy. 
Part II discusses the case law surrounding congressional standing, 
including three Supreme Court decisions and multiple federal circuit court 
decisions interpreting the Supreme Court’s holdings on legislative standing. 
Part III concludes that Congress has standing to sue the President in 
instances of executive nonenforcement. This Part also addresses potential 
concerns with granting congressional standing and demonstrates why a 
lawsuit is the best option for Congress to reaffirm its unique legislative 
role. Part IV then discusses the political question doctrine and suggests that 
the courts are the most appropriate branch to police the boundaries of the 
political branches when they go awry and when political remedies are 
inadequate. 
 
4 See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209 (2001); Ryan McManus, 
Note, Sitting in Congress and Standing in Court: How Presidential Signing Statements Open the Door 
to Legislator Lawsuits, 48 B.C. L. REV. 739 (2007); David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative 
Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205 (2001); Note, Standing in the Way of Separation of Powers: The 
Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741 (1999). 
5 But see Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the 
Enforce-but-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 584–89 (2012), for a discussion on 
presidential interpretation and congressional standing when the President does not enforce the law 
because he “deems it unconstitutional.” 
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I. EXECUTIVE DUTY 
A. Take Care Clause 
The Framers enacted the Take Care Clause to guard against executive 
abuses that were frequent in England.6 The Framers feared an executive 
like the monarch who unilaterally suspended and dispensed the law.7 The 
English monarch’s suspension powers allowed the monarch to single-
handedly nullify the law at whim or “tear to pieces acts of parliament at 
pleasure.”8 Suspensions rendered the entirety of the law void until the 
Crown lifted the suspension—many times after a significant period of time 
had passed.9 Similarly, the Crown’s dispensing power authorized 
“license[s] to transgress”10 acts of parliament by handing out 
“dispensations”—a type of document that allowed favored individuals to 
commit unlawful activity, while maintaining enforcement proceedings 
against others.11 Thus, fearful that executive tyranny would repeat itself in 
the American colonies, the Framers enacted the Take Care Clause to 
impose an enforcement duty on the Executive.12 
 
6 President George Washington, recognizing the duty that the Take Care Clause imposed, said, “It 
is my duty to see the Laws executed: to permit them to be trampled upon with impunity would be 
repugnant to [that duty].” Letter from George Washington, President, to the Secretary of the Treasury 
(Sept. 7, 1792), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 143, 144 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1939); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 796–99, 799 n.97 (citing WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 147–50 (2d ed. 1829)). 
7 See Price, supra note 2, at 689–92. 
8 EDGAR SANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 249 (1882). 
9 Prakash, supra note 3, at 1650–51. 
10 Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament’s Attack upon the Royal Dispensing Power 
1597-1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 198–99 (1985). 
11 Id. 
12 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 
726 n.113 (“[The Take Care Clause] supposedly was the Constitution’s analogue to the English and 
state constitution prohibitions on dispensing and suspending the laws.”); Price, supra note 2, at 693 
(“At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates unanimously rejected a proposal to grant the 
President suspending authority.”); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 802 & n.124 (citing 
JAMES WILSON, Of the Executive Department, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 873, 878 
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007)). George Washington stated “that the legislature ‘alone 
ha[s] authority to suspend the operation of laws.’” Price, supra note 2, at 731 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Alexander Hamilton, Draft of a Proclamation Concerning Opposition to the Excise Law (Sept. 
7, 1792), in 12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 330, 331 n.1 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. 
Cooke eds., 1962); see also FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 4–5 (1994) (noting the importance of English constitutionalism on the Framers’ theories on 
Executive power). For the Court’s affirmation of the President’s enforcement duty, see Office of 
Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 435 (1990), which noted that “[t]he Executive 
Branch does not have the dispensing power on its own and should not be granted such a power by 
judicial authorization.” 
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The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”13 The location of the Take Care Clause in 
Section 3, instead of Section 2, of Article II of the Constitution is evidence 
that the clause imposes a duty upon the President14 and does not simply 
give the President an additional grant of power.15 Section 2 states that the 
President “shall have Power” and then lists several powers unique to the 
President.16 Section 3, however, does not mention the word “power,” but 
rather lists several duties.17 In three of the four Clauses in Section 3, the 
Framers listed the duties of the President, enumerating that the President 
“shall” give to Congress “Information of the State of the Union,” “shall 
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the 
United States.”18 In only one instance in Section 3 does the text not impose 
a duty, stating the President’s prerogative that in “extraordinary Occasions” 
 
13 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
14 See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 12, at 722 (“The Faithful Execution Clause imposes a duty of 
faithful law execution on the only officer who enjoys the executive power.”). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3; see, e.g., Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented 
Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 68 (2014) (discussing the significance of the location of 
the Take Care Clause in the establishment of a duty, not a grant of power). 
16 Section 2 states: 
 The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and 
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he 
may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to 
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of 
Impeachment. 
 He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in 
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
 The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of 
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
17 Section 3 states: 
 He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and 
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he 
may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of 
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to 
such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he 
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the 
United States. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
18 Id.; see e.g., Cruz, supra note 15, at 68–69 (noting the contrasting purposes of Section 2 versus 
Section 3). 
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the President “may” convene both houses of Congress.19 The Framers thus 
distinguished between the President’s duties and the President’s 
prerogative by using contrasting language like “shall” and “may” within 
the same Section. Nevertheless, the Take Care Clause expressly states that 
the President “shall”—not may—“take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,”20 imposing a duty upon the Executive, which the Supreme Court 
has affirmed.21 
Contrary to the Crown’s suspension and dispensation powers, the 
Take Care Clause confines the President to faithfully enforce laws passed 
by Congress, depriving the President of the freedom to make unilateral 
policy choices as the English Crown once had.22 This constitutional duty to 
enforce, and not make, the law undoubtedly upholds the rule of law, 
reinforcing the norm that the United States is a “government of laws, and 
not of men.”23 Therefore, despite partisan disagreements with the substance 
or wisdom of the congressionally enacted law, the President is bound to 
both obey and execute the law.24 
 
19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see, e.g., Cruz, supra note 15, at 69. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Further, the President’s duty to execute the law is enforced by the oath 
of office every President takes. Upon being sworn in, each President states: “I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of 
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 8; see also 2013 Hearing, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Jonathan Turley, Shapiro Professor of 
Public Interest Law, The George Washington University Law School). The order of the Clauses in 
Article II is significant. The presidential oath precedes the Take Care Clause, establishing the 
President’s duty to perform his executive function. The clause following the Take Care Clause allows 
for the impeachment and removal of the President, further suggesting the importance of the President’s 
duty to faithfully execute laws passed by Congress and the consequences for failing to uphold this duty. 
See 2013 Hearing, supra note 2, at 16; see also U.S. CONST., art. II, §§ 3–4. 
21 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 (1988) (noting that the Take Care Clause imposes a 
“constitutionally appointed duty”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go 
beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”); 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) (stating that it is the “high duty” of the President 
to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”). 
22 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 2, at 798–808. 
23 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit 
K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (2014) 
(discussing the threat of unchecked presidential inaction on separation of powers). 
24 RAWLE, supra note 6, at 147–50. The Constitution’s authorization of the veto gives the President 
the ability to partake in the legislative process and have his objections recognized before a bill becomes 
a law. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. However, after the bill becomes law, the President must enforce 
the law under the Take Care Clause. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) 
(holding the line item veto unconstitutional); see also John T. Pierpont, Jr., Note, Checking Executive 
Disregard, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 337–41 (2010) (arguing that executive disregard, or the failure 
to enforce the law, is unconstitutional under Clinton v. City of New York because it repeals or amends a 
valid statute without going through the formalistic process of bicameralism and presentment). Further, 
if Congress overrides the President’s veto, yet the President nevertheless chooses to not enforce the law, 
the President renders Congress’s constitutional ability to override the President’s veto worthless. See id. 
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B. Steel Seizure and Separation of Powers 
The Court affirmed the duty of the President to submit to 
congressionally enacted law in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
(Steel Seizure).25 Due to an impending strike from U.S. steel workers 
during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order, 
directing the Secretary of Commerce to operate the nation’s steel mills.26 
President Truman justified his actions by citing the gravity of the national 
security risk that would be created by ceasing the production of steel that 
was necessary to make weapons.27 However, the steel companies argued 
that the seizure was illegal because neither Congress nor the text of the 
Constitution authorized the President’s actions.28 
The Court rejected President Truman’s argument, holding that under 
the Take Care Clause, the President does not have inherent presidential 
power, but rather his actions must be authorized by statute or the text of the 
Constitution.29 The Court similarly recognized the distinct role of Congress 
in creating policy and legislation, rejecting the President as a 
policymaker.30 Instead, the Take Care Clause reinforces the distinct roles of 
each branch of government. The Court stated that “[i]n the framework of 
our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”31 Further, the Court 
interpreted the Take Care Clause as a duty, not an additional grant of 
power.32 
In Justice Jackson’s widely accepted concurrence, he outlined a 
tripartite framework for understanding the proper exercise of executive 
authority. When the President acts with Congress’s authorization, the 
President’s power is at its greatest.33 “When the President acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
 
at 354. Understanding the Take Care Clause as a duty is thus the only reading of the Constitution that 
does not render the veto and congressional override provisions of the Constitution meaningless. 
25 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
26 Id. at 582. 
27 Id. at 582–84. 
28 Id. at 583. 
29 Id. at 585. 
30 Id. at 587–88 (“The Constitution limits [the President’s] functions in the lawmaking process to 
the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is 
neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.”). 
31 Id. at 587. 
32 See id. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing Little v. Bareme, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 170 (1804)); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
493 (“It is [the President’s] responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”). 
33 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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own independent powers” as he has received no congressional directive.34 
However, “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress his power is at its lowest ebb . . . for 
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.”35 Thus, under Justice Jackson’s framework, when the President 
acts contrary to Congress’s expressed will, his power is unconstitutional 
under his Take Care Clause duties. 
C. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Although the Take Care Clause imposes the duty on the President to 
faithfully enforce the law, the President nevertheless retains discretion in 
enforcing the law. Prosecutorial, or executive, discretion is the power of an 
“official charged with enforcement of the law to exercise selectivity in the 
choice of occasions for the law’s enforcement.”36 This discretion is noted 
by Article II, Section 3’s use of the word “faithfully” modifying 
“execut[ion],” recognizing that it might not be within the President’s 
limited power to fully enforce every law passed by Congress.37 But the crux 
of the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute is a contextual, case-by-case 
assessment.38 Executive discretion is necessary because the Executive is 
tasked with applying broad, general congressional directives to particular 
cases, all the while maintaining the spirit of the congressional enactment.39 
As the D.C. Circuit stated: “The power to decide when to investigate, and 
when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to see to the 
faithful execution of the laws . . . .”40 
Although the Executive may retain the power not to enforce, the 
exercise of this discretion cannot invalidate the duty imposed by the Take 
Care Clause to enforce the law. In other words, the discretion given by the 
word “faithfully” cannot render the duty to “take care” void.41 The 
Executive Branch thus oversteps into Congress’s territory when it “uses 
enforcement discretion to categorically suspend enforcement or to license 
 
34 Id. at 637. 
35 Id. at 637–38. 
36 Roger P. Joseph, Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 130 (1975). 
37 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”); see also Price, supra note 2, at 698 (elucidating the term “faithfully” and recognizing 
the limitations on enforcement allowed by the word). 
38 See Cruz, supra note 15, at 76. 
39 See Price, supra note 2, at 675–76. 
40 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
41 See Cruz, supra note 15, at 76–77. 
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particular violations.”42 To maintain this discretionary balance, the refusal 
to prosecute cannot be a “categorical, prospective suspension” of a statute, 
harkening back to the Crown’s suspension and dispensation abuses.43 In 
keeping with the historical understanding of the Take Care Clause, the 
Executive may only refuse enforcement of the law based on “equitable, 
case-specific considerations.”44 Prosecutorial discretion is limited,45 and 
courts have a role in policing the boundaries of prosecutorial discretion.46 
But proper executive discretion and executive nonenforcement should 
be delineated. Although the Take Care Clause undoubtedly leaves room for 
discretion, it does not give the President the power to unilaterally disregard 
statutory provisions or entire statutes47 based on her own policy 
predilections.48 Rather, prosecutorial discretion requires a case-by-case 
assessment of the equity involved in enforcing the law against particular 
plaintiffs—not a complete abandonment of enforcement.49 Indeed, courts 
should be capable of making the delineation between the categorical 
suspension of a statute or its provisions (implicating executive inaction) 
versus nonenforcement on a case-by-case basis (implicating prosecutorial 
discretion).50 
 
42 See Price, supra note 2, at 676. 
43 Id. at 760. 
44 See id. at 676. 
45 See, e.g., Bragan v. Poindexter, 249 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that prosecutorial 
discretion is not “unfettered” (quoting United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1145 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 25 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting certification is 
subject to prosecutorial discretion, but courts have the authority to review the discretion in instances 
where bad faith is alleged); United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(applying a good faith standard in adjudicating a prosecutorial inaction), abrogated on other grounds by 
United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 2001). 
47 See Cruz, supra note 15, at 78. 
48 Furthermore, in INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court struck down the one-House legislative veto, 
holding that for a legislative act to be constitutional, it must satisfy the formalistic requirements of 
presentment and bicameralism. 462 U.S. 919, 955–59 (1983). By unilaterally waiving a statute or its 
provisions, the Executive does not submit to the constitutional formalistic process of bicameralism and 
presentment required for repealing laws. See id.  
49 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 670 (1985) (“[T]he executive has the power to set enforcement priorities and to allocate 
resources to those problems that, in the judgment of the executive, seem most severe. . . . But there is a 
distinction between exercising such discretion and refusing to carry out obligations that Congress has 
imposed on the executive. The distinction turns, here as elsewhere, on interpretation of the substantive 
statute. Although there will be difficult intermediate cases, the ‘take Care’ clause does not authorize the 
executive to fail to enforce those laws of which it disapproves.” (emphasis added)). 
50 Further, a court’s ability to parse this distinction may be aided by assessing the budget and 
resources that have been congressionally allocated towards enforcement. This will help determine 
whether the Executive’s nonenforcement was in good faith. See Randy Barnett, The President’s Duty of 
Good Faith Performance, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/12/the-presidents-duty-of-good-
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D. The Modern Problem of Presidential Nonenforcement 
Executive inaction is increasingly taking center stage in American 
politics.51 To appeal to constituents, both presidents and presidential 
candidates have claimed that they will not enforce certain provisions of 
duly enacted laws.52 Presidential inaction is increasingly used as a tool to 
curry constituent favor, despite the fact that a law has satisfied the 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment.53 In effect, executive 
inaction takes the policymaking abilities out of the hands of Congress, 
placing it in the hands of the Executive. 
For example, President George W. Bush has been blamed for failing 
to enforce the law by pursuing “deregulation through enforcement.”54 
Scholar Daniel Deacon argued that the Bush Administration abused its 
prosecutorial discretion when it decreased its enforcement of Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) violations.55 A report by the Minority Staff of 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 
discovered that while the number of FDA violations had not declined 
substantially from 2000 to 2005, the number of warning letters the FDA 
sent decreased by fifty percent.56 The Committee’s report found that the 
FDA declined to follow its field officials’ enforcement recommendations, 
and when it did act, it “undermined the efforts of field officials through 
extended delays in acting on the enforcement recommendations.”57 
Similarly, the Bush Administration has been blamed for its lack of rigor in 
prosecuting defendants in lawsuits against the Environmental Protection 
Agency in comparison to previous administrations.58 
Additionally, presidential candidate Mitt Romney sought to use 
executive inaction as a tool to advance his policy goals. During the 
 
faith-performance/ [https://perma.cc/F4G2-VYVQ] (comparing the President’s duty to execute the law 
to the UCC’s duty of good faith enforcement under § 1-304). 
51 See Love & Garg, supra note 23, at 1197–98 (discussing several examples of presidential 
nonenforcement). 
52 See id. 
53 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also supra note 48. 
54 Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795 (2010). 
55 Id. at 808. 
56 SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIV., MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH 
CONG., PRESCRIPTION FOR HARM: THE DECLINE IN FDA ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY, at i (2006). 
57 Id. at 11.  
58 See Deacon, supra note 54, at 809. It should be noted that these examples involving the Bush 
Administration more closely resemble prosecutorial discretion than complete nonenforcement of a 
provision or law because there is no indication that the Administration refused to completely enforce 
the law. A good faith assessment and further research into the Administration’s budget, costs, priorities, 
and current social problems of the era would help ascertain whether the Administration is guilty of not 
enforcing the law, or simply setting different priorities from the previous administration. 
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Republican Presidential Debates of 2012, Governor Romney confidently 
stated that his first act as President would be to grant all fifty states a 
waiver from the Affordable Care Act (ACA).59 Thus, Governor Romney 
declared that he would unilaterally refuse to enforce the law, despite the 
statute’s language outlining mandatory state action. Here, Governor 
Romney appealed to Republican and Libertarian constituents that were 
decidedly against the ACA. 
Surprisingly, President Obama also used nonenforcement to 
unilaterally alter the ACA’s health insurance requirements. The 
Administration announced that “health insurance issuers may choose to 
continue coverage that would otherwise be terminated or cancelled, and 
affected individuals and small businesses may choose to re-enroll in such 
coverage” despite not complying with the ACA’s clear statutory 
requirements.60 Although Congress specifically mandated that the 
provisions would go into full effect on January 1, 2014,61 President Obama 
communicated that he would not enforce the law against many insurance 
companies until 2016.62 The Obama Administration also unilaterally 
amended the ACA’s employer mandate provisions. The employer mandate 
provisions declared that starting December 31, 2013, all large employers 
must give their full-time employees and their dependents the ability to 
enroll in coverage “under an eligible employer-sponsored plan” or pay a 
tax.63 But the Treasury Department unilaterally changed the date that the 
penalties would go into effect. The Department declared that it was 
“extending . . . transition relief to the employer shared responsibility 
payments. These payments will not apply for 2014. Any employer shared 
responsibility payments will not apply until 2015.”64 
 
59 Governor Mitt Romney, Republican Presidential Candidates Debate in Ames, Iowa (Aug. 11, 
2011), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=90711 [http://perma.cc/X8D4-R2KB]) 
(“And if I’m president of the United States, on my first day, I’ll direct the secretary of HHS to grant a 
waiver from Obamacare to all 50 states.”). 
60 Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Insurance 
Commissioners (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/Downloads/
commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.PDF [http://perma.cc/8TC6-N4A8]. 
61 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513(d), 124 Stat. 
119, 256 (2010) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply to months beginning after 
December 31, 2013.”). 
62 Louise Radnofsky, Obama Gives Health Plans Added Two-Year Reprieve, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 
2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303369904579421541748450598 
[http://perma.cc/X2NH-FK83]. 
63 ACA, § 1513 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(b), (d)). 
64 Mark J. Mazur, Continuing to Implement the ACA in a Careful, Thoughtful Manner, U.S. DEP’T 
OF TREASURY: TREASURY NOTES BLOG (July 2, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/
Continuing-to-Implement-the-ACA-in-a-Careful-Thoughtful-Manner-.aspx [http://perma.cc/X54K-
W5KE]. 
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President Obama also unilaterally suspended federal legislation that 
outlawed marijuana use.65 The Controlled Substances Act creates 
mandatory minimum sentences for marijuana possession.66 Yet the Obama 
Administration’s Department of Justice issued memorandums detailing its 
reasons for not prosecuting marijuana charges against individuals in states 
that legalized marijuana,67 or against those who use marijuana for medical 
reasons in accordance with state law.68 
Similarly, the Obama Administration single-handedly nullified a 
central provision of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program that was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act.69 TANF mandated that welfare recipients 
engage in work within twenty-four months of receiving welfare.70 The 
Obama Administration nevertheless waived TANF work requirements as 
applied to the states, allowing recipients to receive welfare without abiding 
by statutory requirements.71 
President Obama also refused to defend Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA)72 when it was contested in federal court.73 Despite 
the Department of Justice’s “longstanding practice of defending the 
constitutionality of duly-enacted statutes if reasonable arguments can be 
made in their defense,” the Administration refused to defend the law.74 This 
 
65 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012). 
66 Id. 
67 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected U.S. 
Attorneys 1–2 (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/RB8L-P9H8] (directing federal prosecutors to “not focus federal resources in your 
States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws 
providing for the medical use of marijuana”). 
68 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. 
Attorneys 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/3QES-TC4Z].  
69 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
71 See Memorandum from Earl S. Johnson, Dir., Office of Family Assistance, to States 
Administering the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program and Other Interested 
Parties (July 12, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/policy/im-ofa/2012/
im201203/im201203 [http://perma.cc/96B3-RNNK] (providing guidance concerning waiver and 
expenditure authority under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act).  
72 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
73 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
74 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-
223.html [http://perma.cc/NN77-AQP5]. 
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compelled the House of Representatives to use the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group to defend the law instead.75 
When presidents act against Congress by unilaterally waiving 
statutory provisions or simply not enforcing the law, the President’s power 
is at its “lowest ebb” and threatens the “equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system.”76 Steel Seizure rejected inherent presidential power 
and held that the President is obligated to enforce the law.77 If this modern 
trend of nonenforcement continues, administrations will increasingly act in 
violation of the Take Care Clause, using nonenforcement to further partisan 
policy goals. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL STANDING 
As the Executive increasingly nullifies and suspends the law, it should 
be asked whether Congress as an institution has standing to sue the 
Executive to enforce the law as written under the Take Care Clause. First, 
this discussion starts by assessing whether Supreme Court case law 
supports legislative standing in instances of presidential inaction. This Part 
will examine the three Supreme Court cases that have addressed 
Congressional standing: Coleman v. Miller, Raines v. Byrd, and Arizona 
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. 
Second, because the Court decided Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission in June 2015, at the writing of this 
Note there have been few federal court cases that have applied the Court’s 
recent decision. This Part is thus confined to assess the legal landscape 
post-Coleman and Raines. Finally, this Part considers the Boehner lawsuit 
as an example of a suit involving executive nonenforcement and 
congressional standing. 
A. Article III and Prudential Standing 
Standing exists in two forms: Article III standing and prudential 
standing. The Supreme Court has traditionally outlined three necessary 
features of Article III standing that plaintiffs must satisfy: injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability.78 An injury must be “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent,” not merely “‘conjectural’ or 
 
75 Abby Goodnough, Appeals Court Hears Arguments on Gay Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/us/court-hears-arguments-on-defense-of-marriage-
act.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/56CL-9NE7]. 
76 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 25–35. 
78 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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‘hypothetical.’”79 To satisfy causation and redressability, plaintiffs must 
allege an injury that is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”80 
Formerly, prudential standing entailed additional factors, such as a 
prohibition against generalized grievances, a prohibition against litigating 
the rights of third parties, and the requirement that the interests of the 
plaintiff be within the statute’s zone of interests.81 But in Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., the Court eliminated 
as prudential requirements the zone of interests requirement and the ban on 
generalized grievances, seemingly considering them as constitutional 
requirements, and possibly eliminating prudential standing altogether.82 
Although it appears that, currently, prudential standing nevertheless 
entails a prohibition against litigating the rights of third parties, the 
contours of prudential standing are indeterminate. Whatever the Court 
defines as prudential standing, however, may be superseded by legislation. 
Article III standing, on the other hand, is a constitutional requirement that 
cannot be altered by legislation. Thus, for Congress to have standing, it 
must, at a bare minimum, satisfy Article III’s standing requirements. 
B. Supreme Court Precedent: Coleman, Raines, and 
Arizona State Legislature 
Three Supreme Court cases directly address congressional standing: 
Coleman v. Miller,83 Raines v. Byrd,84 and Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.85 
In Coleman, twenty of Kansas’s forty state senators voted against the 
proposed “Child Labor Amendment” to the United States Constitution.86 To 
break the twenty-to-twenty tie, Kansas’s Lieutenant Governor, the 
presiding officer of the Kansas Senate, cast the tiebreaking vote in favor of 
the resolution.87 The Kansas House of Representatives later adopted the 
 
79 Id. at 560. 
80 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
81 See id. 
82 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 (2014). 
83 307 U.S. 433 (1939). For opinions recognizing the precedential value of Coleman, see Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2015); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2713 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting); and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 
(1962). But see Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2696 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Coleman was a 
peculiar case that may well stand for nothing.”). 
84 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
85 135 S. Ct. 2652. 
86 307 U.S. at 435–36.  
87 Id. at 436. 
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resolution.88 Consequently, these twenty state senators, in addition to 
another state senator and three Kansas house members, filed suit, 
challenging the authority of the Kansas Lieutenant Governor to cast the 
tiebreaking vote.89 The Supreme Court upheld standing for at least the 
twenty state senators claiming an institutional injury, yet ruled against them 
on the merits of the suit.90 The Court determined that they had standing 
because their votes against ratification had been “overridden and virtually 
held for naught” and they had “a plain, direct and adequate interest in 
maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”91 The Court reasoned that the 
invalidation of these legislators’ expressed institutional will was sufficient 
to grant standing. 
Then in Raines, four U.S. senators and two U.S. congressmen 
challenged the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act.92 When 
Congress voted on the Line Item Veto Act, these members each voted 
against the measure.93 Despite their objections, a majority of Congress 
passed the legislation and it was subsequently enacted.94 The day after the 
Act went into effect, these members filed suit against the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.95 They 
claimed that the Line Item Veto Act wrongly diluted their Article I voting 
power by giving the President the authority to cancel spending and tax 
measures after the bills were enacted.96 They asserted constitutional 
standing to sue because “[t]his alteration of the legal effect of a Member’s 
vote is an injury in fact.”97 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that these 
“individual members of Congress [did] not have a sufficient ‘personal 
stake’ in [the] dispute and [did] not allege[] a sufficiently concrete injury to 
have established Article III standing” to maintain suit.98 The Court 
distinguished Coleman, stating that in contrast to the members in Coleman, 
these members’ “votes were given full effect,” not amounting to vote 




90 Id. at 437, 456. 
91 Id. at 438. 




96 See id. at 817. 
97 Brief for Appellees, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (No. 96-1671), 1997 WL 251423, 
at *25. 
98 Raines, 521 U.S. at 830. 
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legislative power.”99 Instead, the Court stated that “legislators whose votes 
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act 
have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not 
go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely 
nullified.”100 
Additionally, the Court noted that, in contrast to Coleman, these 
members filed suit on an individual basis, not representing their respective 
Houses.101 Indeed, both Houses opposed their suit.102 These members also 
retained an alternative remedy: the Act could be repealed, individual 
spending bills could be given a statutory exemption, or a plaintiff with an 
injury in fact resulting from the Act could challenge its constitutionality.103 
Arizona State Legislature added further analysis to the legislature–
plaintiff issue. Arizona voters adopted Proposition 106, a constitutional 
amendment that took redistricting power away from the Arizona state 
legislature and gave it to the Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission.104 After the Commission adopted redistricting maps, the 
Arizona state legislature brought suit against the Commission, claiming 
that the map violated the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
usurping the state legislature’s redistricting power.105 
The Supreme Court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to 
sue, “having lost authority to draw congressional districts.”106 Unlike the 
Raines plaintiffs, who did not represent their Houses of Congress, the 
Arizona State Legislature plaintiffs asserted an institutional injury similar 
to the injury in Coleman.107 In accordance with Raines’s vote-nullification 
standard, the Court reasoned that Proposition 106 would have completely 
nullified the Arizona legislature’s votes to redistrict.108 Therefore, the Court 
 
99 Id. at 824–26. 
100 Id. at 823 (interpreting Coleman’s holding). 
101 Id. at 829. It should also be noted that unlike the plaintiffs in Coleman, who were Kansas state 
legislators, the plaintiffs in Raines were U.S. legislators. While the Court does not acknowledge this as 
relevant in its standing analysis, this is a possible distinction that future courts attempting to draw 
delineations might recognize.  
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015). 
105 Id. at 2658–59. 
106 Id. at 2659. 
107 Id. at 2664 (“The Arizona Legislature, in contrast, is an institutional plaintiff asserting an 
institutional injury, and it commenced this action after authorizing votes in both of its chambers.”). 
108 Id. at 2665 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–24 (1997)). 
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ruled that a legislature, as an institution, has standing to sue when its votes 
are nullified.109 
The Court, however, mentioned in a footnote that Arizona State 
Legislature does not address whether Congress has standing to sue the 
President.110 The issue thus remains unresolved as to whether Congress as 
an institution may have standing to challenge the President’s actions. 
C. Post-Raines v. Byrd: Legislative Standing Suits in the 
Circuit Courts111 
1. D.C. Circuit.—Since Raines, various circuit courts have heard 
legislative standing cases.112 In Chenoweth v. Clinton, several U.S. 
representatives, who did not constitute a majority, filed suit against 
President Clinton, alleging that his executive order to establish the 
American Heritage Rivers Initiative was unconstitutional and violated 
federal legislation.113 After failing to enact a bill that would have halted 
implementation of the American Heritage Rivers Initiative, the House 
members sued to enjoin President Clinton from implementing the 
initiative.114 The D.C. Circuit, however, denied standing based in part on 
Raines.115 As in Raines, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that presidential action 
that diluted members’ authority as legislators was too “widely dispersed” 
and “abstract” to constitute standing to sue.116 Because a political remedy 
was available to these House members, the court stated it would seek to 
avoid “meddl[ing] in the internal affairs of the legislative branch.”117 The 
 
109 See id. 
110 Id. at n.12. 
111 Because Arizona State Legislature was handed down last term, and at the writing of this Note 
no circuit courts have applied the Court’s decision, this Section will only address circuit court cases that 
have applied Raines and Coleman because these cases remain good law. 
112 I have selected archetypal cases from the D.C. Circuit and Sixth Circuit because these cases 
provide a greater discussion and analysis of legislative standing in light of Coleman and Raines. 
Additionally, the fact patterns of these cases more closely resemble classic legislative suits. For 
additional circuit court cases discussing legislative standing, see, for example, Russell v. DeJongh, 
491 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2007), denying standing to a Virgin Islands senator for lacking a sufficient 
injury to challenge the governor’s adherence to proper procedure in the judicial appointment process; 
Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 544–46 (9th Cir. 2002), analogizing the position of the 
Governor of Guam to that of the senators in Coleman in granting standing; and Alaska Legislative 
Council v. Babbitt, 181 F.3d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1999), denying standing to individual Alaskan 
legislators and the Alaska Legislative Council for not establishing a “‘personal stake’ in the alleged 
dispute.” 
113 181 F.3d 112, 112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
114 Id. at 113. 
115 See id. at 115. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 116 (alteration in original) (quoting Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 
946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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court concluded that because the House of Representatives did not 
constitute a majority, standing did not exist for lack of an injury in fact.118 
Similarly, in Campbell v. Clinton, the D.C. Circuit denied standing to 
thirty-one U.S. congressional representatives who sought a declaratory 
judgment against President Clinton, claiming that his intervention in 
Kosovo violated the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause in 
the U.S. Constitution.119 Before considering the merits, the court considered 
whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently satisfied the injury in fact element to 
constitute standing. This analysis centered on determining whether the 
Executive’s action nullified congressional votes. In attempting to ascertain 
the Supreme Court’s definition of “nullification,” the court defined the term 
as “treating a vote that did not pass as if it had, or vice versa.”120 The court 
held that the Executive did not nullify these members’ votes because they 
retained alternative legislative remedies.121 Namely, Congress could limit 
the President’s available funds or legislatively outlaw the use of the U.S. 
military in Yugoslavia.122 As a measure of last resort, Congress could also 
vote to impeach the President.123 Because Congress could have employed 
other legislative means to reign in the President’s alleged lawless behavior, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the members’ claims of vote nullification did not 
fit within the “Coleman exception to the Raines rule,” and thus lacked an 
injury, and therefore standing, to bring the lawsuit.124 
Institutional—not merely individual—vote nullification is thus central 
to the D.C. Circuit Court’s assessment of legislative standing.125 Mere vote 
“dilution” or a threat to a legislator’s ability to exercise voting power is not 
determinative. The court suggested, however, that the existence of 
alternative congressional remedies, such as regulation through legislation, 
decreased funding, and even impeachment, are all factors that decrease the 
likelihood that the court will find vote nullification that constitutes an 
adequate injury for standing. 
2. Sixth Circuit.—The Sixth Circuit has also heard cases regarding 
legislative standing. In Baird v. Norton, a state representative and a state 
 
118 See id. at 117. 
119 203 F.3d 19, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
120 Id. at 22. 
121 Id. at 23. 
122 Id. Indeed, a concurrent resolution was proposed to require the President to withdraw U.S. 
troops from the conflict; however, this resolution was defeated. Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 22. 
125 This rule was seemingly affirmed in the Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015). 
PICKETT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:23 PM 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
458 
senator contested the approval of gaming compacts between the state and 
four Indian tribes, arguing that the state legislature followed 
unconstitutional procedures in approving the compacts.126 The Sixth Circuit 
rejected their argument, denying both legislators standing.127 The court 
stated that “[f]or legislators to have standing as legislators, then, they must 
possess votes sufficient to have either defeated or approved the measure at 
issue.”128 Because both state legislators were not joined by a majority of 
their respective chambers, their claim did not amount to vote nullification, 
rather, their votes were merely diluted by the procedure.129 According to the 
court, vote dilution is not enough to grant standing.130 The court noted, 
however, that if the lawsuit had been joined by a majority of other 
members, under Coleman’s rule, it would have granted standing because 
the members’ votes would have been sufficient to defeat the legislation.131 
Because neither legislator could demonstrate that their individual votes 
would have defeated the gaming compacts if the constitutionally required 
procedure had been followed, the Sixth Circuit denied standing.132 
D. Legislative Suits over Nonenforcement: The Boehner Suit 
Cases granting institutional legislator standing are sparse.133 However, 
cases granting standing as a result of legislators suing over executive 
nonenforcement of a statute are almost absent from the federal docket. The 
Boehner lawsuit is the prime example of this kind of lawsuit.134 
In November of 2014, in a suit spearheaded by John Boehner, the U.S. 
House of Representatives sued Sylvia Burwell in her official position as 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Jacob 
Lew in his official capacity as Secretary for the U.S. Department of the 
 
126 266 F.3d 408, 409 (6th Cir. 2001). 
127 Id. at 413. 
128 Id. at 412. 
129 Id. at 412–13. Similar to the D.C. Circuit’s rule on vote nullification, this rule was seemingly 
affirmed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665. 
130 Baird, 266 F.3d at 412–13. 
131 Id. Furthermore, this reasoning was reflected in Arizona State Legislature in its distinction of 
Coleman and Raines. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (“In concluding that the individual 
Members lacked standing, the Court ‘attach[ed] some importance to the fact that [the Raines plaintiffs 
had] not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997))). 
132 Baird, 266 F.3d at 413. 
133 But see, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2652; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 
(1939). 
134 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2015 WL 5294762 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 9, 2015). 
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Treasury.135 A House vote of 225–201 approved a House Resolution to 
initiate a lawsuit.136 Part of the House’s claim concerned the unilateral delay 
of the employer mandate provisions of the ACA.137 The House predicated 
its legal claim on the structure of the U.S. government, arguing that the 
defendants “usurp[ed] the House’s legislative authority” when they 
unilaterally changed or “effectively . . . amended” the date that the 
penalties would go into effect.138 The House stated that it would “continue 
to be injured” due to the defendants’ violation of “Article I, section 1, 
which vests in the Congress ‘[a]ll legislative Powers,’ and Article I, section 
7, clause 2, requiring passage by both the House and Senate, and then 
presentment to the President.”139 
Before the House filed suit, Professor Elizabeth Price Foley testified 
before the House Judiciary Committee to assess whether the House would 
have standing to sue.140 She argued that the President’s failure to execute 
the law establishes an injury in fact.141 Applying Coleman, she argued that 
the President’s refusal to execute the ACA as statutorily outlined nullifies 
the law.142 Foley contended that the President’s failure to enforce the law 
not only nullifies that particular provision, but also reduces the power of 
Congress to pass future legislation.143 This affects these legislators’ singular 
votes and “is the nullification of the legislature as [the] legislature.”144 This 
rises above Raines’s voter dilution standard to the level of an institutional 
harm, exceeding the injury in fact standard under Coleman.145 Unlike in 
Raines, where a group of legislator plaintiffs decided to take their policy 
disagreements to court, according to Foley, here “the legislature qua 
legislature is concretely opposed to the action of the executive.”146 The 
 
135 Complaint at 3, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2015 WL 
5294762 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015). Whether legislators sue the President or the heads of departments 
appears to be immaterial to the court’s standing analysis. This inquiry, however, is beyond the scope of 
this Note. For a discussion on lawsuits against the President, see Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the 
President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612 (1997). 
136 Complaint, supra note 135, at 5. 
137 Id. at 14. For an overview of the employer mandate’s delay, see supra text accompanying notes 
63–64.  
138 Complaint, supra note 135, at 23–24. 
139 Id. 
140 Enforcing the President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 61 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Hearing] (statement of 
Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law). 




145 Id.  
146 Id. 
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Court’s decision in Arizona State Legislature, granting the Arizona 
legislature as an institution standing, seemingly affirmed Foley’s thesis: the 
House plaintiff, as an institution, now may have standing to sue.147 
Shortly after Arizona State Legislature was decided, in September of 
2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted standing 
to the U.S. House of Representatives to challenge the Executive’s 
withdrawal of Treasury funds in the absence of a congressional 
appropriation authorizing this withdrawal.148 The court noted that the 
House’s “Non-Appropriation Theory” alleged a violation of Article I, 
Section 9, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution.149 Article I, Section 9, 
Clause 7 grants Congress the exclusive power over the purse, giving 
Congress the sole ability to adopt laws to appropriate Treasury funds.150 
The court applied Raines and Arizona State Legislature, arguing that a suit 
initiated by an institution, such as the House, does not allege an injury that 
is “too widely dispersed,” but alleges an injury that “affect[s] all members 
of Congress in the same broad and undifferentiated manner.”151 The 
Executive’s actions in bypassing Congress to “spend funds however it 
pleases,” thus constituted a concrete and particularized harm to the 
House.152 The court therefore granted the House standing to redress this 
harm.153 
The court, however, further held that the House lacked standing to 
challenge the Treasury’s alleged amendment to the ACA’s employer 
mandate provisions.154 The court categorized the House’s complaint based 
on the employer mandate not in terms of executive nonenforcement, but in 
terms of executive “extra-statutory action.”155 The court concluded that the 
House alleged not a constitutional violation, as in the House’s Non-
Appropriation Theory, but a statutory violation.156 This constituted a 
generalized injury as “every instance of an extra-statutory action by an 
Executive officer might constitute a cognizable constitutional violation, 
 
147 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–65 
(2015) (recognizing institutional standing). 
148 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2015 WL 5294762, at *1 
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015). 
149 Id. at *13. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at *14 (quoting Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2002); then citing Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997); and then citing Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664). 
152 Id. at *13. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *1. 
155 Id. at *18. 
156 Id. 
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redressable by Congress through a lawsuit.”157 Additionally, the court noted 
that the House’s alleged injury could not be properly redressed under 
Article III; a ruling in favor of the House would only provide the “‘psychic 
satisfaction’ of knowing ‘that the Nation’s laws are faithfully enforced.’”158 
The court therefore held that the House did not allege a concrete and 
particularized harm, and consequently denied standing as to this issue.159 
Although the court did not adopt a theory of standing in instances of 
executive nonenforcement, the court also did not reject this theory of 
standing. Rather, the court failed to adopt Foley’s proposed theory of 
executive nonenforcement, conceptualizing the Executive’s delay of the 
employer mandate provisions as “extra-statutory” executive action 
instead.160 It thus remains undecided as to whether a legislative body may 
have standing to sue in instances of executive nonenforcement. 
III. APPLYING COURT PRECEDENT 
On theoretical grounds, executive nonenforcement adulterates our 
government of separation of powers because the Executive usurps 
Congress’s legislative and policy roles when determining which laws 
should be enforced. Even from a functionalist perspective, in cases of 
nonenforcement, Congress has not delegated or provided an “intelligible 
principle” to guide the Executive’s use of legislative power.161 Rather, the 
President aggregates legislative power to himself at the expense of 
Congress by unilaterally repealing (through nonenforcement) duly enacted 
acts of Congress. Indeed, the use of executive authority against the express 
will of Congress is unconstitutional under Steel Seizure as the President’s 
power is at its “lowest ebb.”162 From a formalist perspective, the argument 
is even stronger: the President’s exercise of legislative power in unilaterally 
repealing various acts of Congress violates the text of the Constitution and 
amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.163 The 
Executive thus has a duty under the Take Care Clause to enforce the law, 
and a failure to do so should be corrected. 
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)). 
159 Id. at *19. 
160 See id. at *18. 
161 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress ‘shall lay down 
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the 
delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of 
legislative power.’” (alteration in original) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
162 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
163 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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This discussion starts by assessing whether the aforementioned case 
law supports legislative standing in cases of presidential inaction. Applying 
the holdings and language from these cases, this Part concludes that, in 
instances of executive nonenforcement, these holdings support a finding of 
congressional standing under Article III. 
A. Applying Supreme Court Precedent to Instances of Executive 
Nonenforcement: Coleman and Raines 
Under Coleman, a majority of Congress has standing to sue when the 
President does not enforce a duly enacted, unambiguous statute.164 When 
the President refuses to enforce a statute, she “overrid[es]” and holds “for 
naught” the legislature’s votes.165 The majority of the House or Senate has 
“a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of 
their votes,” and the President, by nonenforcement, completely eliminates 
this effectiveness, satisfying the Coleman standard.166 
Courts would be able to distinguish Raines in cases of executive 
nonenforcement. Unlike Raines, legislative votes that are not enforced are 
not given “full effect,” thus constituting “vote nullification,” not merely 
“abstract dilution of institutional legislative power.”167 Further, presidential 
inaction seems to exceed the Coleman standard. At least in Coleman, the 
legislators’ votes were considered, but ultimately defeated by the 
Lieutenant Governor’s final tiebreaking vote. In cases of presidential 
nonenforcement, however, Congress’s validly cast votes receive no 
consideration, rendering them invalid or as if they were never cast. This 
therefore exceeds Coleman’s standards for granting standing, for the 
Executive’s actions further delegitimize Congress as an institution. 
Moreover, legislative standing does not require both the Senate and 
the House to be represented in the lawsuit.168 Thus, a suit similar to the 
Boehner lawsuit, where only the House as an institution is represented, can 
proceed under Coleman, so long as the unenforced legislation has been 
previously enacted into law.169 However, for a congressional suit based on 
presidential inaction to be successful, it cannot be filed on an individual 
basis. Rather, a House or Senate majority must challenge executive 
 
164 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939). 
165 See id. at 438. 
166 See id. 
167 521 U.S. 811, 824–26 (1997). 
168 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446 (granting legislator standing for at least twenty state senators).  
169 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664–65 
(2015) (affirming Coleman in holding that the legislature as an institution has standing to sue). 
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inaction under Raines and Arizona State Legislature.170 As a matter of 
policy, this would theoretically help to cabin strike suits by individual 
disgruntled members, though it might still encourage strike suits from 
different parties that occupy a majority in Congress. 
For a court to grant legislative standing, however, alternative remedies 
cannot be available to individual members.171 But alternative remedies in 
cases of nonenforcement are not obvious. United States v. Windsor 
explores some of these remedies.172 
In Windsor, the Executive enforced the law but refused to defend the 
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in court.173 In 
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, he affirmed the Court’s decision in 
Coleman, stating that “because legislating is Congress’ central function, 
any impairment of that function is a . . . grievous injury.”174 He argued that 
the Executive nullified the House of Representatives votes because the 
House “was a necessary party to DOMA’s passage” and “the House’s vote 
would have been sufficient to prevent DOMA’s repeal.”175 Justice Alito 
thus considered there to be only one proper solution: granting Congress 
standing when the President refuses to defend the law. 
Justice Scalia took a different approach, however. In Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in Windsor, he lambasted the notion that “Congress can 
hale the Executive before the courts not only to vindicate its own 
institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the 
execution of its laws.”176 Instead, Justice Scalia argues that Congress’s 
“only recourse is to confront the President directly” by rejecting 
presidential appointments, eliminating congressional funding, or even 
impeaching the President.177 Justice Scalia concluded that this should be left 
“to a tug of war between the President and the Congress,” and in these 
types of cases, the judiciary should be relegated to the sidelines.178 
But Justice Scalia’s alternative remedies skew the balance of powers 
towards the Executive, aggregating more power to the President and slowly 
 
170 See id.; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). 
171 Cf. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (denying individual members of Congress standing “neither 
deprives Members of Congress of an adequate remedy (since they may repeal the Act or exempt 
appropriations bills from its reach), nor forecloses the Act from constitutional challenge (by someone 
who suffers judicially cognizable injury as a result of the Act)”). 
172 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
173 Id. at 2684. 
174 Id. at 2713 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
175 Id.  
176 See id. at 2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 2702, 2704–05. 
178 Id. 
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stripping Congress of its powers. Fundamentally, this sets a presumption 
against nonenforcement and incentivizes the President to continue 
threatening nonenforcement to coerce Congress into actualizing the 
President’s will. Mandating that Congress take additional action because 
the President has failed to perform his duty implicitly affirms the 
President’s actions.179 Requiring Congress to impeach, cut funding, deny 
appointments, or reaffirm a bill places the burden on Congress to act to 
compel the President to perform duties already owed to Congress and to the 
U.S. public.180 Rather, as with contracts, the breaching party should be the 
party required to make amends to the party that has fulfilled its duties—not 
the other way around. The presumption should simply be in favor of 
enforcement, and Congress should not have to reaffirm its commitment to 
duly enacted legislation by freezing budgets, refusing appointees, or 
impeaching the President. 
Reenacting a law is also difficult if the makeup of the Senate or House 
is different. Requiring Congress to submit to the legislative process a 
second time would invite the President to act with the hope that, by the 
time Congress has to reaffirm the statute, the makeup of Congress is more 
favorable to the President’s party. Additionally, requiring Congress to 
reenact a law could severely destabilize the rule of law. For instance, if a 
law has been duly enacted and enforced by a former President, the next 
administration could simply refuse to enforce a law that the people have 
come to rely upon. This would threaten the rule of law because it would 
give the Executive the sole power to alter the country’s entire legal 
landscape every four or eight years. The people’s faith in the law would 
thus be diminished because the ability to predict and order life around the 
law could be dramatically changed by the whims of a single person. This 
harkens back to the very purpose the Take Care Clause was enacted: to 
restrict the Executive’s suspension and dispensation power.181 
Furthermore, if Congress must resort to these alternative remedies, it 
will likely thwart the structure of our democracy because it will skew 
political accountability. Instead of holding the President accountable for 
failing to execute the law, if the Court mandates that Congress must 
 
179 See 2014 Hearing, supra note 140, at 93 (statement of Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law, 
Florida International University College of Law) (implying that alternative remedies “tilts the balance 
of powers unfairly toward the Executive” and creates a “perverse rule of law”). 
180 Id. at 93–94. Indeed, even if Congress did enact another law, affirming the former, there is no 
guarantee that the President would then enforce the law the second time around—or third or fourth or 
fifth time around. See id. at 93 (“Asking Congress to re-enact a law it has already enacted—hoping the 
President will faithfully execute it the second time around—is both inefficient and tilts the balance of 
powers unfairly toward the Executive . . . .”). 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 6–12. 
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exercise these alternative remedies, the electorate might see Congress as 
the troublemakers and therefore hold Congress, instead of the President, 
accountable through the electoral process. Resorting to these alternative 
remedies—instead of directly confronting the Executive with a lawsuit—
may thus undermine the democratic process, which is premised on the 
principle of political commitment: holding elected representatives 
accountable for their actions.182 
Justice Scalia’s alternative remedies also make enforcement of the law 
harder.183 Requiring Congress to defund the very law the President has 
failed to enforce, or defund other congressionally enacted laws in order to 
compel the President to enforce the law is counterproductive.184 If Congress 
desires to have its laws enforced, Congress should not be required to 
engage in self-defeating actions.185 
Similarly, impeachment proceedings are an extreme remedy to 
presidential nonenforcement. Courts should not encourage impeachment 
“as a[] preferable alternative to a peaceful judicial determination of 
constitutional parameters.”186 Primarily, the President may be a popular 
president whose performance is exemplary in every other area.187 Judicial 
intervention is preferable to impeachment because it addresses the 
President’s particular area of wrongdoing, instead of broadly attacking the 
President and, in effect, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Further, 
even if Congress successfully impeaches the President, there is no 
guarantee that the next President would then enforce the law.188 
Invoking impeachment as an alternative remedy also does not square 
with the Court’s reasoning in Coleman.189 Instead of resorting to the courts, 
the Kansas legislature could have impeached the Lieutenant Governor for 
improperly breaking the senate’s tied vote.190 However, the Court 
recognized that impeachment would not have remedied the nullification 
injury.191 Thus, contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion that impeachment is 
 
182 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136 (1995). 
183 2014 Hearing, supra note 140, at 93 (statement of Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law, 
Florida International University College of Law). 
184 See id. 
185 See id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 93–94. 
188 Id. at 94. 
189 See id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
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a viable remedy for presidential misbehavior, impeachment should only be 
invoked in dire circumstances where judicial intervention has failed.192 
Additionally, remedies provided by private plaintiffs are unlikely.193 It 
is uncertain whether an individual private plaintiff could sue over 
nonenforcement because the injury would be a generalized grievance 
shared by the rest of the population.194 Even if the grievance were not 
generalized, a plaintiff would have to further argue that she is concretely 
harmed by the Executive’s absence of action. Unlike Congress’s loss of 
voting power, private plaintiffs have not lost anything they once had.195 It is 
thus unlikely that the Court would hold that the absence of an action 
constitutes particular, concrete harm, giving a private plaintiff standing in 
instances of executive nonenforcement. Therefore, when the President fails 
to enforce the law, alternative remedies are inadequate.196 
B. Applying the Circuit Courts’ Reasoning to Instances of 
Executive Nonenforcement 
1. D.C. Circuit.—Because of the dearth of doctrine and unclear tests, 
federal courts have struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s precedent in 
Raines and Coleman. But even in the D.C. Circuit, which has been hesitant 
to grant standing to Congress, instances of presidential nonenforcement 
seem to satisfy the standards the D.C. Circuit has erected. 
Vote nullification, not merely dilution, is required to establish 
standing. Vote nullification occurs when a vote has been “overridden and 
virtually held for naught”197 or when “a vote that did not pass [is treated] as 
if it had, or vice versa.”198 Cases of nonenforcement exceed mere 
“dilution,” as congressional action is annulled, canceled, or never 
actualized. Instances of executive nonenforcement fall squarely into this 
definition because the President treats votes that passed as if they had not 
 
192 See id. at 93 (“[I]mpeachment . . . should be a very last resort . . . .”).  
193 See id. at 83–87. 
194 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). 
195 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Chenoweth v. Clinton, 
181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
196 In Raines, the Court declined to find legislator standing because a private plaintiff, who did not 
raise a “dispute over the allocation of power between the political branches,” could have brought suit 
(as later occurred in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)). Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 
833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Because the existence of a private plaintiff is unlikely 
in instances of executive nonenforcement, if a court does not grant standing, the issue will remain 
entirely unresolved. 2014 Hearing, supra note 140, at 83, 87 (statement of Elizabeth Price Foley, 
Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law). 
197 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939). 
198 Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22. 
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passed. Therefore, under the language and reasoning of Campbell, 
nonenforcement would constitute voter nullification. 
As in Raines, the presence of alternative remedies factor into the D.C. 
Circuit’s interpretation of vote nullification and weaken the likelihood that 
the court would grant standing. However, it is uncertain whether this factor 
is dispositive under Campbell, or whether a court would deny standing 
based solely on these factors, especially given the severity of vote 
nullification. Nevertheless the same alternative remedies analysis would 
apply here.199 In Campbell, a resolution was defeated that would have 
forbidden the President to act, whereas in cases of nonenforcement a statute 
has already been enacted that depends upon the President’s action. Indeed, 
in instances of nonenforcement, Congress has passed a directive instructing 
the President to act, and therefore should not be required to act again to 
force the President into compliance. As discussed, this tips the balance of 
powers further towards the Executive at the expense of Congress and may 
result in extreme, broad-brushed attempts to secure executive compliance. 
However, a dispositive factor in the D.C. Circuit’s standing analysis, 
and subsequently Arizona State Legislature’s analysis, centers around the 
number of members that sued.200 The D.C. Circuit rejected legislator 
standing because the members suing did not constitute a majority.201 But 
instances in which a majority of Senate or House members sue over 
presidential nonenforcement seemingly would satisfy the D.C. Circuit and 
the Arizona State Legislature’s standing threshold. 
Therefore, according to the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning, it is likely that an 
instance of presidential inaction would satisfy the D.C. Circuit’s legislative 
standing requirements. 
2. Sixth Circuit.—The Sixth Circuit has taken an approach similar to 
the D.C. Circuit, emphasizing the amount of votes necessary to constitute 
vote nullification.202 If a majority of the Senate or House sues over 
presidential nonenforcement, Congress as an institution has standing 
because it “possess[es] votes sufficient to have either defeated or approved 
the measure at issue,” constituting vote nullification, not merely vote 
 
199 See supra text accompanying notes 179–196. 
200 See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20, 23 (noting that a resolution to outlaw the use of U.S. forces was 
defeated 139–290 in Congress, but nevertheless disgruntled members of Congress in the minority sued, 
seeking a declaratory judgment against the President); Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 117 (stating that “the 
Representatives do not allege that the necessary majorities in the Congress voted to block the AHRI”); 
see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2015) 
(“The Arizona Legislature, in contrast [to Raines], is an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional 
injury, and it commenced this action after authorizing votes in both of its chambers.”). 
201 Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 117. 
202 See Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408, 412 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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dilution.203 It is not necessary for the majority of both houses of Congress to 
be represented in the action, but rather only a majority from one house to 
constitute the number of necessary votes.204 Therefore, if the President 
refuses to enforce the law, a suit from a majority of the Senate or House 
would possess the necessary votes to constitute vote nullification. 
C. Article III Standing for Executive Nonenforcement 
This Section contends that congressional lawsuits for executive 
nonenforcement satisfy the three Article III requirements for standing: (1) 
injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.205 Each of these 
requirements is discussed below. 
1. Injury in Fact.—The nullification of a majority of house 
members’ votes constitutes an injury in fact.206 Courts also assess whether 
the President’s action (or lack of action) has reduced Congress’s legislative 
powers as an institution—not merely reduced the powers of individual 
members.207 In instances of executive nonenforcement, the President’s 
inaction of ignoring the statute’s express language takes the practical form 
of a congressional repeal—a task that is constitutionally solely reserved for 
Congress. Therefore, because the majority of Congress’s votes have been 
nullified and its power as an institution has been reduced, Congress as an 
institution is injured by the Executive’s dereliction of his duty to enforce 
duly enacted law. 
2. Causation and Redressability.—Most courts have not been 
presented with legislative standing cases in which the injury in fact 
threshold was satisfied, and thus have not analyzed the other Article III 
requirements: causation and redressability. In one of the few cases granting 
standing, however, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that causation and 
redressability are satisfied when the legislature’s authority to make laws is 
 
203 Id.; see also Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664–65. 
204 Baird, 266 F.3d at 412–13 (“Under Raines, however, if Baird’s lawsuit had been joined by other 
members of the Michigan House of Representatives whose total votes (and non-votes) would have been 
sufficient to defeat the necessary legislation, then this group of lawmakers, like the twenty state senators 
in Coleman, would have had standing as legislators based on vote nullification. If, for example, Baird 
had been joined by eight of the fifteen members of the Michigan House who did not vote when CR 115 
was passed, then their non-votes, coupled with the forty-seven votes actually cast against CR 115, 
would have been sufficient to defeat the legislation that Baird claims is constitutionally required—i.e., 
eight of the non-votes, plus forty-seven ‘nay’ votes, effectively equals fifty-five votes against the 
measure under the Michigan Constitution’s requirement that a majority of all votes is necessary to enact 
legislation.”). 
205 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
206 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997); see also Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 
2664–65. 
207 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 21–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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reinstated.208 In Kerr v. Hickenlooper, several state legislators challenged 
the constitutionality of the Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR), an 
amendment to the Colorado state constitution.209 TABOR was adopted via 
voter referendum and forbade state and local legislators from increasing tax 
rates without voter approval.210 The court held that these legislators alleged 
a sufficient injury in fact to grant standing and determined that causation 
and redressability were likewise satisfied because the nullification of 
TABOR would give the legislators the ability to directly vote for increased 
taxes without the threat of invalidation from state voters.211 
By mandating that the President enforce the law, courts reinstate the 
legislature’s authority to make laws, which adequately redresses the 
legislature–plaintiff’s injury. Whereas in Kerr, the Tenth Circuit forbade 
state officers from enforcing the constitutional amendment, here, courts 
could require executive officers to enforce the law, redressing the 
plaintiff’s injury.212 
In Arizona State Legislature, the Court also ruled that causation and 
redressability were satisfied. The Court noted that Proposition 106’s 
conferral of authority to the Commission instead of the state legislature 
“strips the Legislature of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting” and 
reasoned that the legislature’s redistricting power would be remedied by an 
order enjoining Proposition 106’s enforcement.213 Just as the Arizona 
legislature’s allegedly unique power over redistricting would be remedied 
by a court order enjoining enforcement, Congress’s power over legislating 
would be remedied by a court order mandating executive enforcement. 
 
208 Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). 
Although the Supreme Court vacated Kerr in light of Arizona State Legislature, this was seemingly 
done for the lack of an institutional plaintiff. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664–65. In 
theory, if Colorado’s General Assembly, instead of several individual legislators, initiated a similar 
lawsuit, the Court would likely grant standing and this same reasoning on causation and redressability 
could likely be applied. As one of the few cases that discusses causation and redressability in a 
congressional–plaintiff lawsuit, the Court’s causation and redressability analysis is thus still relevant to 
this discussion, and in the least, serves as a blueprint for future courts that may analyze these 
requirements of Article III standing. Furthermore, it should be noted that Arizona State Legislature did 
not reverse Kerr. At the writing of this Note, the significance of this remand is still unclear. 
209 Kerr, 744 F.3d at 1161. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 1171. 
212 Cf. id. It should be noted, however, that this causal link may be weakened when Congress does 
not sufficiently fund the Executive Branch so that it may execute the law. Therefore, courts could likely 
only require the Executive Branch to enforce the law in clear-cut cases of Executive nonenforcement—
not in cases of permissible prosecutorial discretion. See supra note 50 for a discussion of this 
delineation.  
213 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015). 
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Therefore, according to the language and reasoning of various courts, 
it would seem that Congress would have standing in instances of 
presidential inaction. 
IV. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
It is less certain that the judiciary is the appropriate body to remedy 
Congress’s injury, on the other hand. The courts traditionally have not been 
eager to involve themselves in such institutional disputes because they do 
not want to be seen as taking sides in a political war.214 
This Part responds to these concerns. First, this Part discusses the 
essence of the political question doctrine and addresses the effect of the 
political question doctrine on cases initiated by congressional plaintiffs. 
Lastly, this Part considers the viability of political remedies in instances of 
executive nonenforcement. 
A. The Political Question Doctrine and Legislative Standing 
The political question doctrine is a judge-made doctrine that places 
certain political questions beyond the court’s reach, making the action 
nonjusticiable.215 In Baker v. Carr, the Court announced a test to determine 
whether a question is political in nature, reasoning that there must be: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.216 
For the suit to be within the reach of the political question doctrine and thus 
left to the political process, one of these conditions must exist.217 
Although the political question doctrine is evaluated independently 
from the congressional standing analysis, it typically becomes relevant in 
 
214 See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912) (holding that the case 
was not within the Court’s jurisdiction “[a]s the issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have 
long since by this court been, definitely determined to be political and governmental, and embraced 
within the scope of the powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial 
power”). 
215 For a critique of the political question doctrine, see Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the 
“Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031 (1985). 
216 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
217 Id. 
PICKETT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:23 PM 
110:439 (2016) Congressional Standing and Presidential Nonenforcement 
471 
congressional standing cases where standing is granted.218 In Coleman, the 
Court did not reach a conclusion regarding the applicability of the political 
question doctrine on suits initiated by legislator plaintiffs.219 Instead, the 
Court allowed the lawsuit to proceed, refraining from dismissing the suit on 
nonjusticiablility grounds.220 Suits initiated by congressional plaintiffs, 
therefore, are not per se barred by the political question doctrine, and 
indeed, courts have upheld legislative suits regardless of the political 
question doctrine’s relevance. The reach of the political question doctrine 
on legislative suits, however, is still being shaped.221 
B. The Inadequacy of Political Remedies 
In 2014, Senator Ron Johnson filed a lawsuit against the President for 
requiring legislators and their staff to enroll in the new Affordable Care Act 
exchanges.222 In Johnson v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 
a district judge dismissed Senator Johnson’s suit for lack of standing.223 The 
court reasoned that “there is nothing in the Constitution stipulating that all 
wrongs must have remedies, much less that the remedy must lie in federal 
court. In fact, given the Constitution’s parsimonious grant of judicial 
authority, just the opposite is true.”224 Rather, the judge stated that the 
political process is the best remedial tool.225 
 
218 See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-1967 (RMC), 2015 WL 5294762, 
at *21–22 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2015) (granting the U.S. House of Representatives standing and dismissing 
political question doctrine concerns); Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(maintaining that the legislators’ suit was not barred by the political question doctrine), vacated on 
other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015) (mem.). But see Baird v. Norton, 266 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(not discussing the political question doctrine because the court dismissed the legislators’ suit for lack 
of standing); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (dismissing the legislator’s suit for lack 
of standing and not discussing the political question doctrine in the majority opinion); Chenoweth v. 
Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that legislators lacked standing and not discussing the 
political question doctrine). 
219 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447 (1939) (finding legislator standing and discussing the 
relevance of the political question doctrine, but ultimately concluding that the “Court is equally 
divided” on the issue and therefore “expresses no opinion upon that point”). 
220 Id. 
221 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 n.12 
(2015) (“[A] suit between Congress and the President would raise separation-of-powers 
concerns . . . .”). 
222 Ryan Lovelace, Senator Ron Johnson Appealing his Decision that Dismissed His Lawsuit 
Against President Obama, NAT’L REV.: THE CORNER (Aug. 4, 2014, 3:56 PM) 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/384547/senator-ron-johnson-appealing-decision-dismissed-his-
lawsuit-against-President-obama [http://perma.cc/DMB2-GXE6]. 
223 No. 14-C-0009 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2014), aff’d, 783 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015). 
224 Id. at 17. 
225 Id. at 17–18. 
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Along those same lines, in Arizona State Legislature, Justice Scalia 
criticized the majority’s decision, which conferred standing to the Arizona 
legislature.226 According to Scalia, political disputes between different 
branches of government do not constitute “cases” or “controversies.”227 
Rather, the Constitution only authorizes the courts to decide disputes 
regarding the rights of individuals.228 As an early commentator on the 
American government and Constitution, Alexander de Tocqueville noted 
the role of the judiciary in adjudicating private disputes. De Tocqueville 
reasoned that by confining courts to preside over an individual’s trial, 
“legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily 
aggressions of party spirit.”229 If a judge confronted legislators, a judge 
would unnecessarily involve himself in the political process because “he 
would sometimes be afraid to oppose [the legislator]; and at other times 
party spirit might encourage him to brave it at every turn.”230 Instead, the 
American system keeps judges at bay: A judge is called into the political 
sphere “independently of his own will” and “[t]he political question that he 
is called upon to resolve is connected with the interests of the parties.”231 
Judges therefore intervene in the political process to adjudicate cases only 
insofar as they must resolve the constitutional violations and bring justice 
to remedy the party’s alleged injury.232 
Illustrating de Tocqueville’s point, Justice Scalia discusses examples 
of separation of powers cases, which if the majority is correct, “took an 
awfully circuitous route to get here.”233 Indeed, in these cases, an 
institutional body such as the President or the Senate could have directly 
sued the other branch of government to obtain relief.234 Instead, the Court 
heard cases on behalf of injured private plaintiffs.235 Justice Scalia’s 
analysis thus hinges on the availability of a private plaintiff to bring suit to 
address the injury. 
 
226 135 S. Ct. at 2694 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)). 
229 Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 102 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
1945)). 
230 Id. (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 229, at 102). 
231 Id. (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 229, at 103). 
232 See id. (quoting DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 229, at 103). 
233 Id. at 2695 (first discussing Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015); then 
discussing Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); and then discussing NLRB 
v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)). 
234 Id. 
235 See id. 
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But a private plaintiff is unavailable in instances of executive 
nonenforcement.236 Although the cases Justice Scalia mentions took a 
circuitous route, in instances of nonenforcement, there is simply no route to 
relief unless the Court grants Congress standing. The cases Justice Scalia 
references were rightly brought by private plaintiffs and kept the judiciary 
from unnecessarily involving itself in the political arena, but when the 
Executive refuses to enforce the law and no private plaintiff exists, the 
judiciary is likewise relegated to the outskirts of the political arena. In 
instances of executive nonenforcement, judges are therefore called to enter 
into the public square in limited circumstances, independently of their will 
and only insofar as they adjudicate the rights of the injured party.237 Similar 
to a suit by a private plaintiff, aggressions of the party spirit would be 
curbed because the judiciary would not be called upon to attack the wisdom 
of legislation, but simply to interpret and apply the Constitution’s mandate 
that the President take care of the laws.238 
Further, it is the duty of the judiciary to police the boundaries of each 
branch of government to maintain separation of powers and prevent one 
branch from unconstitutionally aggregating the power of another.239 Indeed, 
majoritarian branches should not be their own arbitrators.240 
In cases of presidential nonenforcement, political remedies have 
already been attempted and failed. Specifically, by electing their 
representatives, the people have already spoken through their 
representatives that they desire the enforcement of certain legislation. For 
this reason, it seems unreasonable to require that the citizenry wait until the 
next election cycle to remove the President for failing to enforce the law.241 
Similar to the problems entailed in requiring a majoritarian remedy such as 
 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 193–196. 
237 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 229, at 102–03. 
238 See id. 
239 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“[W]e have not hesitated to strike down 
provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among 
separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate 
Branch.”); REDISH, supra note 182, at 3–4; Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to 
Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449 
(1991) (describing the role of the judiciary to police the branches from exercising authority outside their 
constitutionally delineated powers). 
240 See REDISH, supra note 182, at 170 n.28 (“But our nation’s founders consciously rejected the 
British system by choosing to adopt a formal, written, countermajoritarian constitution. The function of 
formally controlling the majoritarian branches by means of a written constitution would thus be 
undermined absent judicial review.”); Redish & Cisar, supra note 239, at 493–94 (“Because of its 
uniquely insulated position, the judiciary is especially suited to enforce the provisions of a counter-
majoritarian Constitution.” (footnote omitted)). 
241 Although the length of litigation is typically long and may not even be complete by the next 
election cycle, in the very least, the threat or the initiation of a lawsuit would encourage presidents to 
enforce the law. 
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impeachment, a president may otherwise preform her job well, so requiring 
the political process to remove the President would be too broad a solution 
to remedy the particular instance of nonenforcement.242 
Any solution whereby Congress must act again to affirm its desire to 
have the Executive enforce the law wrongly sets a presumption in favor of 
nonenforcement. Once it is established as precedent that Congress must 
reaffirm its already expressed will, then the question becomes quantitative 
and qualitative—how many times must Congress reaffirm itself or how 
much has Congress demonstrated its desire for enforcement? This would 
construct a new presumption that unless Congress really expresses its 
desire to have the laws enforced, the Executive is under no obligation to 
enforce the law.243 This, however, reads the Take Care Clause entirely out 
of the Constitution and returns us to an era where the Executive retained 
the tyrannical powers of suspension and dispensation of the laws.244 
Political remedies are therefore inadequate for addressing executive 
nonenforcement. 
Finally, judicial intervention in political disputes is not novel. Courts 
have previously reviewed inaction with the school desegregation cases, 
mandating executive action without usurping executive functions.245 Just as 
ordering executive action in the past has succeeded, court-ordered 
executive action in instances of presidential nonenforcement could succeed 
as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The Take Care Clause imposes a duty on all presidents to faithfully 
enforce the law. The President cannot act as a policymaker by dispensing 
or suspending the law. Amending and repealing legislation is a role solely 
reserved for Congress. With increasing frequency, however, presidents and 
presidential candidates have aggregated legislative power to themselves, in 
effect repealing laws by failing to enforce them. Congress thus needs a way 
to assert its unique legislative role and reorient the balance of powers that 
the Executive has skewed towards itself. 
The nonmajoritarian branch—the courts—should take on this 
responsibility. On a doctrinal level, federal courts precedent indicates that 
the courts would grant congressional standing in instances of presidential 
 
242 See supra text accompanying notes 186–191. 
243 See 2014 Hearing, supra note 140, at 93 (statement of Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law, 
Florida International University College of Law). 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 6–12. 
245 Sunstein, supra note 49, at 671 n.108 (1985) (first citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); and then citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). 
PICKETT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2016 12:23 PM 
110:439 (2016) Congressional Standing and Presidential Nonenforcement 
475 
nonenforcement. By not enforcing duly enacted legislation, the Executive 
nullifies legislators’ votes because it treats votes that should have gone into 
effect as if they did not go into effect. This surpasses mere voter dilution, 
constituting vote nullification, and thus establishing an injury in fact. 
Courts may redress this injury by mandating that the Executive enforce the 
law as written. Therefore, injury, causation, and redressability are satisfied, 
establishing congressional standing. 
On a policy level, the courts provide specified recourse, defining and 
addressing the parameters of the Executive’s misconduct without resorting 
to extreme and broad-brushed remedies. Courts also have the capacity to 
delineate between executive discretion, as applied equitably on a case-by-
case basis, and executive nonenforcement, which takes the form of a 
unilateral waiver of a provision or statute without regard to the merits of 
the circumstance. Courts should therefore grant institutional standing to 
Congress to protect the separation of powers inherent in our Constitution 
and uphold Congress’s unique legislative role. 
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